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‘Is there not some other way of playing the game that consists neither of acquiescence 
and reproduction nor of utter refusal, that is neither wholly dialogical nor utterly 
polemical – some way of using rights to play a different game, perhaps?’ (Golder, 116)  
 
Foucault’s rules of a different game are clear and constant throughout his work; they are 
critique and resistance. In Foucault and the Politics of Rights, Ben Golder appropriates these 
rules to tell us about the different, and tactical, game of rights that Foucault encourages 
us to play – a game Golder calls ‘a critical counter-conduct of rights’. This clever 
phrase captures how rights can be understood differently and so be used as tactical 
instruments, or tools, of resistance in political struggles. Of course, ‘rights’ have a different 
meaning to the juridical concept of entitlement here; they are, rather, both tainted with 
and promising of an ambivalence, which means they can and must be tactically re-
claimed towards a different strategy. Golder thus respects the overarching idea of 
critique as a permanent attitude of thinking differently that is oriented towards the 
possibility of becoming otherwise. And he is faithful to Foucault’s own position that, 
with respect to possibilities (even in rights) ‘resistance comes first.’ Resistance is thus a 
creative process that allows us to change how we conventionally think rights and a 
critical call to change the game, one that Golder advocates so well in his book. This is a 
book which is not only beautifully conceived but gracefully written and through 
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which Golder has made a remarkable intervention into the field of Foucault studies, 
human rights and political theory. I can see it being of immense value to researchers and 
students of Foucault on rights and on Foucauldian critique alike. 
In playing Foucault’s different game of ‘critical counter-conducts’, the book asks 
a set of interpretative and directly political questions. In terms of the former, Golder 
asks, what is a Foucauldian politics of rights and how is it to be understood in 
light of his work as a whole? To address the latter he asks, what is the value of 
Foucault’s critical and tactical interventions into rights discourse? How might a 
Foucauldian politics of rights avoid being coopted into the hegemonic discourse of 
rights? And what is gained and lost in embracing the Foucauldian politics of rights? Do 
we forego the possibility of thinking an alternative to rights? These questions feed into 
the two main aims of the book: first, to explain the notion of a ‘Foucauldian politics of 
rights’ by exploring the late Foucault; and, second, to explore the possibilities and the 
limits of such a politics.  
 Golder engages in a meticulous examination of the late Foucault and his 
engagement with rights. He goes to great lengths to refute the so-called ‘turn’ that 
Foucault made to rights after the mid-1970s and to instead show, on the one hand, how 
there is continuity and development of Foucault’s previous methods and concerns in his 
rights talk and, on the other hand, to evidence when, where and how Foucault talked 
about rights (as counter-conduct). His efforts are highly convincing. We are left 
persuaded that Foucault’s ‘curious deployment of rights’ is not curious at all (13). 
The idea of Foucault as a rights theorist might seem unlikely given the two central 
thematic concerns of his previous work – the decentering of a sovereign, universal 
(rights-bearing?) subject and the critique of sovereign power in favour of disciplinary, 
biopolitical and governmental power relations, which would also coopt rights as a form 
of power relation. Chapter 1 (‘Critical Counter-Conducts’) presents Golder’s reading of 
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Foucault’s challenge to these two underlying presuppositions of liberal rights theory. 
Following the recognisable division of Foucault’s ‘oeuvre’ into archaeological, 
genealogical and ethical phases, Golder traces the consistency in Foucault’s conceptions 
of critique and resistance that lead him to understanding power as governmentality, and 
the subject as capable of an ethics of the self. The ‘problematic of governmentality’ as 
concerned with conduct is also then concerned with counter-conduct (which he explains 
as stemming from the ‘counter-strokes’ Foucault identified against the form of conduct 
defined as pastoral power) (54). Counter-conduct forms a continuous and consistent way 
in which Foucault engages with rights, for two reasons: the first is chronological – the 
particular ‘fragment’1 of thought that Foucault was interested in from the mid-1970s 
onwards, counter-conduct (see in particular the Security, Territory, Population lecture series) 
coincides with his interest in rights. The second reason is that counter-conduct, as the 
next step in Foucault’s thought, is also a refinement of his previous theorisations on 
power and resistance. Counter-conduct helps explain how rights are at once forms of 
regulation and of resistance; how they might be used to penser autrement and to play a 
different game (see 41).  
 Foucault’s engagement with rights is thus ambivalent (in that it sees rights as 
simultaneously ‘liberatory and subjectifying’), ungrounded (in that it lacks a 
naturalized subject of rights) and strategic (in so far as rights promise 
possibilities as tactical political instruments). These three dimensions of a critical 
counter-conduct of rights form the backbone of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of Golder’s book. 
Chapter 2 (‘Who is the Subject of (Foucault’s Human) Rights?’) explores the contingent 
and ungrounded nature of rights. Reading Foucault alongside Judith Butler and Jacques 
Rancière, Golder questions the ‘human’ of Foucault’s human rights. Golder substantiates 
                                                 
1 Foucault refers to the absence of any coherent whole in his work, describing his ‘researches’ as ‘just 
fragments, and it is up to you or me to see what we can make of them’ – see Michel Foucault, ‘Two 
Lectures’ in M Foucault, Power/Knowledge (C Gordon, ed; C Gordon and others, trs) (Longman, London 
1980) 78, 78-9; and, Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 3.  
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his reading with three examples from Foucault’s invocation of rights discourse: his 
criticism of Bazargan’s post-revolutionary regime for its failure to honour pre-
revolutionary promises in the aftermath of his visit to Iran in 1978; his support for the 
Polish solidarity movement; and that more well-known statement ‘Confronting 
Governments’, given to mark the creation of the International Committee against Piracy 
in 1981 and in which Foucault advocates a right of the governed (76-78). Foucault’s 
contingent or ungrounded subject is, he concludes, one that is capable of ethical self-
formation. Rather than presupposing a subject of rights or naturalizing a certain figure of 
humanity, he thus occupies the human of rights differently. Foucault’s is a performative 
account of rights claiming; quoting Foucault, Golder explains, ‘it is because I defend 
myself that my rights exist’. (80) Far from being impaired by the absence of a ‘subject’, 
this leaves human rights open to multiple possibilities of the human. Yet, are these 
possibilities hampered by the very dynamics of rights claiming; that is, is there something 
within the very modality of a right that contours and circumscribes the possibilities of the 
human? This ambivalent quality of rights is the subject of Chapter 3 (‘The Ambivalence 
of Rights’).  
 Rights are unavoidably emancipatory and regulatory. Golder uncovers this 
paradoxical potential of rights with help from Wendy Brown and by examining how 
Foucault problematizes rights to sexuality. The way in which Golder unearths interviews 
Foucault gave in the early 1980s on the sexual identity, sexual choice and sexual will to 
interrogate whether and when the ambivalent logic of rights will present a useful means 
for political struggle is both fascinating and masterly. (104-7) The right to (choose one’s) 
sexuality, while important, is nonetheless a disciplinary tool that must be re-appropriated 
in a political move. The political task that rights demand and enable is not (only) to claim 
a juridical right but to create, innovate and ‘become’ – in this instance/example, to create 
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culture, to become gay.2 To the more familiar ‘new right’ (of the governed) that Foucault 
propounded in ‘Confronting Governments’, Golder thus excavates the idea of rights as 
‘truth-weapons’, critical tools for political subjects to protect and advance their interests, 
and a ‘new relational right’ (97, 107). This relational right is a relation to self and 
others, an ethics; it can enable transformation and new affective relationships. As Golder 
notes, Foucault has a ‘queer’ affective possibility in mind, which he labels ‘friendship’ 
(108). The new relational right, and creating friendship as a way of life, therefore opens 
up exciting new possibilities to ‘carve out a [new] space’ for individuals to not only assert 
rights to (sexual) identity but to go a step further and ‘elude’ the normalizing effects of 
categories into which ordinary claims to rights place them (i.e. ‘gay man’) (108-9). The 
new relational right can thus be used as counter-conduct. Golder has therefore 
successfully not only traced Foucault’s lesser known later engagements with rights but 
explained how rights when seized as counter-conducts offer possibilities for new 
relations and relationships, and a new way of life. 
 Rights are then tactical instruments that can be part of a broader strategic 
struggle, as Golder explains in Chapter 4 (‘Rights Between Tactics and Strategy’). He 
traces the language of tactics and strategy from Clausewitz to Gramsci to Foucault, to 
conclude that rights are ‘the tactic called in aid of the strategy of an aesthetics of 
existence’. (138) Not only can individual rights be used to articulate political struggle (in 
fact, this is not, according to a critical counter-conduct of rights their main aim) they can 
be used to play a different game – that is, to articulate a different mode of life. Golder 
illustrates how this is possible, or promised, using the example of the right to die, or 
suicide. The exercise of a right to die, when read through a critical counter-conduct lens, 
has a performative effect; we change ourselves in the process and become otherwise. It is 
also and moreover ethical conduct, in that this right can be understood as an aesthetic 
                                                 
2 See Foucault, ‘Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity’, 163-4.  
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and creative act. Foucault, Golder proves, thus approaches the right to die tactically (i.e. 
using it as a tool) to provoke us to rethink our lives and how we want to live them under 
biopolitical care. And in doing so, he forms a strategy – one of rupture, where the game 
of rights is played differently, for different ends (a new mode of life rather than tolerance 
respect or equal treatment). That this is a deliberately crafted strategic game is further 
proved through Golder’s exploration of the death penalty in Foucault’s work. Here 
Golder explains how Foucault strategically retreats from a tactical use of rights to assert 
that recourse to the language of rights will not advance the cause of abolition (138-9). 
Foucault is thus, Golder concludes, a ‘strategic political thinker’ (147). 
 In his Conclusion, Golder returns to two big questions that formed the basis 
of the interrogation in his book: first, how can we explain Foucault’s ‘turn’ to 
rights and, second, what is the something more that Foucault gives us – and how 
might it speak to our contemporary political concerns? Has Golder fulfilled his 
mission in answering these interrogations? In terms of the first question, he most 
definitely has. Foucault’s thought fragments on rights have been explained and ordered 
as a consistent and flowing body of work, as rules for how to tactically do rights almost, that 
Golder names a  ‘critical counter-conduct of rights’. This means that rights can be used 
to mean and to be otherwise. However, Golder does not feign presenting ‘a unified and 
systematic “theory” of rights’. 3  To the contrary, he substantiates his formulation of 
‘critical counter-conducts’ by reading Foucault alongside current thinkers who 
problematise the place of rights in contemporary politics. This wider engagement hints at 
the utility of Foucault’s ‘tool-box’ by pointing to how he has been appropriated by other 
‘users’ (e.g. Brown) and also offers supplements to these tools (e.g. Rancière) that widen 
the breadth of (his) critique of rights. In terms of the second question, the something 
more that Golder roots out in Foucault’s work on rights is how to play a different game; 
                                                 
3 Golder, 23. 
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the rules, for Foucault, have always been the same: play with a critical attitude and resist. 
Golder succinctly elaborates these rules into contingency, ambivalence and 
tactics/strategy. I also think his reference to the ‘new relational right’ adds an ethical 
dimension to the rights game that has so far been missing from contemporary accounts 
of Foucault on rights. 
 The something more that Foucault adds is also, Golder says, not ‘what’ he said 
(about power, the subject and rights) but ‘how’ he approaches his work. This way of 
thinking, the critical attitude, is something we can take into our own work. I 
would only question whether Golder has done this himself. Despite his scrupulous 
account of Foucault (on rights), does he think rights today differently using the critical 
attitude of a critical counter-conduct of rights? The absence of empirical discussion of 
contemporary rights debates or case studies betrays his call to permanent critique and the 
kind of ‘pessimistic activism’ it necessitates (1-3). Also, although Golder asserts he is 
not interested in asking ‘what would Foucault do today?’ (and this perhaps would 
be his answer to the ‘criticism’ I just made), he perhaps focuses too much on 
what Foucault has said. There are points at which the book feels like a homage to 
Foucault. Perhaps, to use Foucault’s own terms, we have ‘a right to be free’ of 
Foucault to the extent that we make his work ‘protest and groan’ in an effort to 
continue the game of permanent critique and resistance.4 In this spirit of permanent 
critique, one of Golder’s final assertions is that ‘It may well be that a Foucauldian 
strategy towards rights today actually counsels a retreat from the terrain of rights’ 
(161). This seems a somewhat bizarre turn to take given the effort spent in the 
previous 160 pages to prove the value of rights for political struggle. The point is 
unsatisfyingly undeveloped, and whilst I understand that it is in the nature of the critical 
                                                 
4 See Michel Foucault, ‘Prison Talk’ in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (C 
Gordon ed, C Gordon and others trans) (Longman, London, 1980) 37, 53-4 on Foucault’s response to his 
use of Nietzsche. 
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attitude to be dissatisfied, surely the essence of (Foucauldian) critique is not to search for 
an alternative (to power/the ungrounded, ambivalent and tactical form of rights) but for 
‘problematiques’ – to create ruptures in the relations of power that we cannot escape but 
can ‘make otherwise’, to play a different game. Saying this, these observations of mine 
can, I’m sure, easily be countered. Golder begins, ‘This is a book about Foucault and the 
politics of rights’. In his presentation of how Foucault did rights, how we can understand 
this work as a critical counter-conduct and how we must continue the work by searching 
‘not for solutions but provocations’,5 he has written just that book. And in doing so, he 
has challenged us to play, albeit within Foucault’s rules, a different game.  
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5 Golder, 161. 
